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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUSAN H. PARKER; DANA SCHACK;
RAND HIRSHl, and all other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

J.

v.

HONORABLE CALVIN L. RAMPTON,
Governor of the State of Utah; and
HONORABLE VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Attorney General of the State of Utah,
Defendants.

Case No.

12494

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in a declaratory judgment action by the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, wherein plaintiffs moved for
a partial summary judgment; seeking a declaration that
Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-12 (1968) applies only to institutionalized persons, such as inmates or patients in state
institutions, and does not prohibit a person who is not
institutionalized from voluntarily undergoing an operaton to destroy in him the power to procreate the human
species. Plaintiffs further claimed to represent a class of
1

persons sufficient to qualify the action as a class action.
In a motion to amend the judgment plaintiffs also sought
to enjoin defendants and all state law enforcement officers from enforcing the above statute with respect to all
noninstitutionalized persons and their physicians.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE DISTRICT COURT
A hearing on plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment was held in the District Court for Salt Lake
County, Judge Stewart Hanson presiding, on January 20,
1971. The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs
on that motion. On April 8, 1971, a hearing was held on
plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment. The court
awarded plaintiffs an injunction against enforcement of
the statute with respect to all noninstitutionalized persons and their physicians.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the partial summary
judgment (as amended) of the district court reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The district court found that each of the named
plaintiffs is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
that each named plaintiff is the parent of two children;
that each named plaintiff desires to undergo a sterilization
operation, but was advised that such action might be a
felony; that each named plaintiff consulted with his/her
physician and was informed by his/her physician that
2

because of Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-12 (1968), said physician would not perform such an operation as he had
been advised that he as a physician performing a sterilization operation could be guilty of a felony; that the defendant, Calvin L. Rampton, is the Governor of the State
of Utah; and, that the defendant, Vernon B. Romney, is
the Attorney General of the State of Utah. The appellants
do not dispute those facts.
The district court made no explicit findings as to the
existence of a class of persons situated similarly to the
named plaintiffs; nor did the district court make any
other findings of fact.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUE IN THE PRESENT DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTION IS A NONJUSTICIABLE POLITICAL QUESTION AND THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN EXERCISING SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.
An action for declaratory judgment must meet all
the usual conditions of an ordinary action, except that
physical injury need not have been accomplished.
It is sufficient if a dispute or controversy as
to legal rights is shown, which, in the court's opinion, requires judicial determination - that is, in
which the court is convinced that by adjudication a useful purpose will be served. The
requisites of justiciability must be present.
Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 29 (2d ed. 1941).

3

Political questions are not justiciable.
It is not within the province of the judiciary
to determine political questions . . . .

* * *

'[P]olitical question' .
is frequently used
to designate all questions that lie outside the scope
of the judicial power. More properly, however,
it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
In determining whether a question is political, the
appropriateness under our system of government
of attributing finality to the action of the political
departments, and also the lack of satisfactory
criteria for a judicial judgment are dominant considerations.
60 Corpus Juris Secundum 698-99 (1965) (emphasis
added). See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454-55
(1939).
Again, the Supreme Court of the United States m
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 ( 1962), said:
Prominent on the surface of any case held
to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an un4

usual need for unquestioning adherance to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious p::onouncements
by various departments on one question.
In Baker v. Carr the court, in dictum, said that if
only one of these formulations was inextricable from the
case, such would be sufficient for dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of the presence of a political
question. In the instant case, at least three of the formulations postulated in Baker v. Carr are inexricably involved.
First, there is in the present suit a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department." The tenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States stipulates:
The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.
Another name given early to this residual sovereignty
of the States was the name "police power." The police
power is the power inherent in the state legislatures to
override, in certain circumstances, private rights of person and property in order that state governments might
efficiently preserve public order and secure the general
welfare of their citizens. See Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, § 1168 (2d ed. 1929).
As stated in Willoughby, supra at § 1176, the police
power:

5

. . . is a general right upon the part of the
public authority to abridge, or if necessary, to destroy, without compensation, the property or contract rights of individuals, and to control their
conduct in so far as this may be necessary for the
protection of the community . . . against danger
m any form, against fraud, or vice. . . .
The legislature transcends the limits of the police
power only when it acts arbitrarily and with no reasonable relation to a purpose which is competent for it to
effect. See Chicago B. & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McQuire, 219

U.S. 549 (1911).

In passing Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-12 (1968) (hereinafter referred to as "the statute"), the legislature of this
state decided that a particular activity, in this case the
voluntary sterilization of noninstitutionalized persons,
is not for the common good or public welfare. The language of the statute follows:
Except as authorized by this chapter, ever)'
person who performs, encourages, assists in or
otherwise promotes the performance of any of the
operations described in this chapter for the pur·
pose of destroying the power to procreate the
human species, unless the same shall be a medical
necessity, is guilty of a felony. (Emphasis added).
This is an entirely appropriate exercise of the police
power. It is a legislative statement to which a great deal
of finality may be attributed by virtue of its frequent restatement through recodification over a period of many
years since its original enactment in 1925. It concerns
subject matter which lends itself best, if not only, to legis-

6

lative treatment, and which suffers under a corresponding
lack of satisfactory criteria for judicial judgment.
Second, the instant case involves "the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." The prohibition
of voluntary sterilizaton serves the state's clear policy
against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramarital, which is a permissible and legitimate legislative goal. The existence of
such a policy in Utah is evident by the restrictive provisions of Utah's abortion law, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-1
0953), and Prophylactic Control Act, Utah Code Ann. §
58-19-1 (1953). The cautious and detailed terms of the
sterilization chapter itself, insofar as it deals with institutionalized sterilization, is evidence of a general policy
against sterilization and a reluctance to allow sterilization except under carefully controlled conditions.
To affirm the court below would be to permit elective sterilization in this state. Defendants submit that by
allowing voluntary sterilization this court would be making an initial policy determination, which is ordinarily the
peculiar province of the legislature.
Third, the instant case involves "a lack of judicially
manageable standards for resolving it." In other words,
there is no satisfactory criterion for judicial
In
the case of the subject matter of the statute in issue, the
legislature is peculiarly equipped to study problems such
as whether or to what degree voluntary sterilization might
effect sexual promiscuity and to ascertain the opinion of

7

the public on the subject. And the legislature alone is i:apable of prescribing standards and procedures to govern
the performance of elective sterilization operations and
adequately deal with the medical and legal ramifications
of such operations in the event that such should some day
become lawful.
It is amply clear from the legislation of other states
that standards and procedures are indeed necessary in
connection with voluntary sterilization and that wideranging study and fact-finding are necessary for the formulation and implementation of such standards and procedures. Female sterilization is a serious operation. In the
cases
both male and female, serious emotional-psychological disturbance, as well as physical complications,
may accompany performance of the operation. These and
many other medical and legal considerations should be
dealt with prior to a decision to make such operations freely obtainable. For example, Virginia and North Carolina,
which have voluntary sterilization laws, require a thirtyday waiting period between the time the operation is requested and the time it is performed and prescribe that
both male and female sterilization operations be performed under hospital conditions. See N. C. Gen. Stat. §§ 90271 through 275 (1965); as amended N.C. Gen. Stat. §
90-271 (Supp. 1969); Va. Code Ann. §§ 32-423 through
426 (1969) as amended Va. Code Ann. § 32-424 (Supp.
1971). These laws also require that the doctor perform
the operation pursuant to a written request of the patient
and, if married, of his or her spouse. It is also necessary
that the surgeon obtain the concurrence of at least one

ffr

8

consulting physician. And there are further considerations with which even these statutes do not adequately
deal:
Although these statutes would seem to preclude any action based upon the legality of a
properly documented operation, they do not automatically insure that the physician will not incur
civil liability, just because the operation is not
negligently performed. He must continue to protect himself against the claim of a warranty of
permanent sterility. Another source of uncertainty
is the failure of the statutes to specify where the
burden of establishing the nonexistence of a spouse
shall lie. The statutory requirement of consent of
both spouses may lend support to a claim that sterilization of the patient without such consent was
an actionable wrong as to the nonconsenting
spouse.
Note. "Elective Sterilization," 113 Pa. L. Rev. 439 (1965 ).
Doctors performing the operations might become objects of tort actions for assault and battery or mayhem
by dissatisfied patients or for alienation of affection by
nonconsenting spouses. Unilateral elective sterilization
may give rise to actions for annulment or divorce by unconsulted or nonconsenting spouses on grounds of "constructive desertion" or fraud in the contract. If no law
on sterilization were in effect, doctors might be liable in
tort actions even where the operation was performed with
consent, because a court might find that the operation· is
against public policy. Consent might also be invalidated
because the patient did not fully comprehend the serious
and permanent consequences of the operation. This claim
would be particularly common where the patient later
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became dissatisfied with the permanent results of the
operation. And although a sterilization performed on a
woman with five children might not be objectionable, a
sterilization performed without regard to the number of
children or the age of the patient may be declared contrary
to public policy. And of course, as alluded to in the above
quotation, a sterilized male whose wife becomes pregnant,
whether as a result of natural reversal, the doctor's negligence, or relations with another man, might sue the operating physician. Many doctors may simply be deterred
from performing the operation out of fear that the unsettled state of the law may encourage patients and pressure groups to involve them in legal controversy.
Even these additional problems, however, could be
cured by legislative action. But to suddenly make voluntary sterilization freely available without any statute or
controls at all would bring not only the additional problems, but all of the problems which are effectively dealt
with in the Virginia and North Carolina statutes. For
example, with no thirty-day waiting period there would
be no assurance of adequate consideration on the part of
the patient of the seriousness of the operation. And without the requirements of hospital conditions and consultation, doctors would be more open to charges of negligence.
These are all difficulties which would anse in the
event that voluntary sterilization were suddenly made
lawful by judicial determination. Although it is true that
such action would put Utah with the majority of the states,
which have no statutory law on the subject, sterilizations
10

have long been performed in those states (not the case in
Utah) and most hospitals in those states have either developed procedures and standards by which they regulate
themselves or refuse to allow sterilization operations to
be performed at all. Such procedures are often at least as
strict and detailed as those embodied in the Virginia and
North Carolina statutes and sometimes include elaborate
age/parity formulae relating to the age of the woman and
the number of children she has living. See Note, "Elective Sterilization," supra, at 419-20.
Not having had occasion to develop such practices,
Utah hospitals are not prepared to cope with voluntary
sterilizations which might be requested.
The experience in states with no law of struggling
with these problems in the course of developing a hospital-by-hospital, patchwork system of self-regulation,
and the occurrence of many of these problems even in
those states with fairly definitive and comprehensive voluntary sterilization statutes, demand the attention of this
state and bid this state to proceed with deliberation, careful study, and reason with regard to any change in policy
in order that if any change is to take place, it may be
accomplished by prescribed standards and procedures
which will allay apprehension, safeguard important
rights, prevent unnecessary litigation and meet with public approval.
Defendants respectfully urge that public policy and
the necessity for extensive fact-finding and opinion-taking
are so interwoven in the matter of voluntary sterilization
11

as to render the matter peculiarly of the political sphere
and appropriate solely to the legislative function; that to
affirm the district court would be to make law, rather
than to interpret law; and, that therefore the matter is
nonjusticiable in character. For this reason defendants
urge that the decision of the district court be reversed.
POINT

II

THE STATUTE PROHIBITS BOTH UNAUTHORIZED STERILIZATION OF INSTITUTIONALIZED
PERSONS AS WELL AS VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION OF NONINSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS
AND THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT
LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
IS IN ERROR.

A
Defendants submit that the language of the statute
is clear and unambiguous on its face and should be given
its common and ordinary meaning; that is to say, t-he
statute is not in need either of construction or interpretation, but should continue in force as it is written. This
rule, embraced in the maxim expresso unius et exclttsio
alterius, that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not and cannot be interpreted by a court, is the most
common rule of statutory construction. See Sutherland,
Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 4502 (1943).
The term interpretation got into the law when
it already had a literary history; and when it was
applied to modern European law, it had developed
a large theological aura as well. It has a strong
suggestion of making clear to an uninitiated group
what an esoteric inner circle knows by some sort
of exclusive transmission. This suggestion may be
12

said to be the basis for that commonest of assertions about statutes, namely, that what we seek to
know is what the legislature or the "legislator"
intended. In literature and theology, that is precisely what we have as our task. But both the literary and theological methods are irrelevant, or
should be so, in the interpretation of statutes . . . . .
The courts have recognized this, in effect,
when they assert that there is no room for interpretation when the meaning is "plain." . . .
[T]here is implicit in [this] rule the notion that
generally there is such a plain meaning, and that
is a meaning at once apparent to the simple, honest, understanding of an ordinary, sensible man.
Any other meaning is under suspicion.
Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863,
867 (1930).
And as one court has said:
[l]t is generally safe to reject an interpretation that does not naturally suggest itself to the
mind of the casual reader, but is rather the result
of a laborious effort to extract from the statute
a meaning which it does not at first seem to convey.

Ardmore Co. v. Bevil, 61 Fed. 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1894);
quoted in Schulthis v. MacDougal, 162 Fed. 331, 340 (E.
D. Okla. 1907).
Defendants maintain that an ordinary, sensible man
could arrive at only one understanding of the statute in
this case. Nowhere in the purview of the statute is mention made of the words "institution" or "institutionalized
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persons," and in no way does the purview of the statute
allude to or imply that the statute does not apply universally to any and all persons, both institutionalized and
noninstitutionalized. Instead, general wording is used,
such as: "Every person who performs," "any of the operations," and "for the purpose of destroying the power to
procreate the human species" (emphasis added). This
generality implies a scope broader than merely the institutional setting. Not only that, but the latter phrase,
especially, is framed in formalisic language which sets
it apart from all references in the chapter to institutionalized persons. Whenever sterilization of such persons is
referred to in the chapter, the words describing the surgical procedure are "sexually sterilized," "sterilization," and
"asexualization." See Utah Code Ann. § 64-10-1 (1968).
The use of such broad, formalistic and commanding language in the statute sets the statute apart from the rest of
the chapter, with the exception of Section 11, which allows destruction of the reproductive functions incidental
to other treatment and which clearly does not refer only
to the institutionalized setting. A common-sense reading
of the statute discloses to the ordinary, noninstitutionalized man the fact that the statute applies to him and that
he would be committing a felony to seek the performance
of or otherwise undergo an operation destroying in him
the power to procreate, unless such an operation were
deemed a medical necessity or occurred incidental to
other treatment administered by a licensed physician. Such
a reading also clearly discloses to the practicing surgeon
that he would be committing a felony to perform such
an operation.
14

Furthermore, an examination of the chapter and the
circumstances existing in state institutions reveals that
the only parties likely to be involved in an unauthorized sterilization of an institutionalized person are the
surgeon, the superintendent of the institution, and the
institutional board. The stringent regulation of state institutions is a practical bar to the possibility of any other
party assisting in or promoting the sterilization of an inmate. With respect to the doctor, it may be safely assumed
that a doctor could not perform a sterilization operation
on an institutionalized person purely on his own authority;
that is, without the further authority required by the
chapter. The controlled conditions at the institutions and
the controlled status of persons committed to them offer
reasonable assurance that no doctor would even have
such an opportunity. However, appellant's literal view
of the statute certainly comprehends and guards against
that possibility as much as does respondent's strained interpretation.
With respect to the latter two parties, it seems logical
that if the statute were meant to prohibit only their participation in institutionalized sterilization operations not
authorized by the chapter, words other than "encourages, assists or otherwise promotes" would have been
used. Those words are the language of common crimes.
For example, Utah Code Ann. § 76-25-1 (1953), which
makes forcible entry and detainer criminal offenses, states:
Every person using, or procuring, encouraging or assisting another to use, any force or violence in entering upon or
any lands or
other possessions of another, except in the cases
15

and in the manner allowed by law, is guilty of a
misdemeanor. <Emphasis added).
The proper words for a provision prohibiting only
unauthorized sterilization of institutionalized persons are
"causes or orders, except as provided in this chapter."
These are the terms used throughout the chapter by which
sterilizations are performed in state institutions. According to Section 1 of the chapter, the superintendent of an
institution may "cause to be performed by some capable
surgeon the operation of sterilization. . . . " And according to Section 7 of the chapter, the superintendent may do
so only under an "order" from the proper board. "Encourages," "assists" and "promotes" do not fit the setting.
A sterilization is "caused" and "ordered." If the statute
was intended to prevent institutionalized sterilization by
improper authorization, the language of the statute would
have employed those terms, which are the terms by which
sterilization would be brought about, whether proper or
improper.
Defendants respectfully submit that by accepting the
district court's interpretation of the statute, this court
would ignore the plain meaning of the statute and, as a
practical matter, render nearly meaningless a direct and
purposeful legislative statement.
Defendants respectfully urge that the statute is clear
and unambiguous in its prohibition of all operations described in the chapter, whether performed in or out of
state institutions, except as such may be authorized by the
chapter, deemed a medical necessity, or occur incidental
to other treatment, and that for this reason the judgment

16

of the district court giving the statute a narrower interpretation should be reversed.
B

Related to the doctrine that a statute will be given
its common and ordinary meaning is the rule that longstanding contemporaneous and practical interpretation of
a statute by the courts and the public constitutes an invaluable aid in determining the meaning of a statute. See
Sutherland, supra at§ 5103.
With respect to the courts, in only one case has this
court had occasion to deal with the statute involved in
this case. In Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921
( 1929), a case holding that sterilization of mental defectives under the same chapter here in question was not
cruel and unusual punishment, this court said, at 86,
923 (emphasis added):
By the act here under review it will be observed that it is made a felony for any person to
perform, encourage, assist in, or otherwise proniote, the performance of any operation for the
purpose of destroying the power to procreate the
human species, except as in the act authorized, unless the same is a medical necessity. It is in effect
urged, that to require the asexualization of a specified class of persons who are inmates of a public
institution, and hence may be segregated and prevented from procreation, and at the same time
to make it a felony to asexualize persons of the
same class who are at liberty to procreate is an
unreasonable and warranted exercise of the police
power. A similar attack was made upon the law
of Virginia without avail in the case of Buck v.
17

Bell [274 U.S. 200 (1927)). The Virginia law
(citation omitted) under review [there] is substantially the same as [the Utah law], except that the
Virginia law does not contain any provision making it a crime to operate upon persons for the purpose of destroying the power to procreate the
human species, as does our law. This difference
between the two laws, however, cannot well be
said to be of controlling importance. . . . We are
of the opinion that the rule announced by that
court in the case of Buck v. Bell, supra, is a complete answer to the claim here made by the appellant that the law under which this proceeding
is had offends against the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States.
A fair and proper interpretation of the language
above would seem to be that in 1929 this court understood, even took for granted, that the statute made the
sterilization of persons who are at liberty a felony and
was a proper legislative use of the police power. The
court considered the difference between the unequal treatment alleged in the case of the Virginia law, i.e., that the
law subjected institutionalized persons to sterilizaticm
operations, but not noninstitutionalized persons, and that
alleged in the case of the Utah law, i.e., that the law subjected institutionalized persons to sterilization operations,
but made it a felony to sterilize noninstitutionalized persons, was an unconsequential difference, and therefore
the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the Virginia case applied also to the Utah case. This
was to say, in effect, that although Utah makes it a felony to perform a sterilization operation on a noninstitutionalized person, for the purposes of an allegation of
discriminatory or unequal treatment of prisoners that is
18

no different than having no law with respect to noninstitutionalized persons, as in Virginia.
Turning to the interpretation given the statute by
the public, it is clear that the statute has been and continues to be commonly understood to prohibit voluntary
sterilization. The following quotations are exemplary:
Three states [Utah, Kansas, Connecticut] expressly prohibit voluntary elective sterilization except for medical indication. Forbes, "Voluntary
Sterilization of Women as a Right," 18 DePaul L.
Rev. 560, 561 (1969).
The legal status of voluntary sterilization is
clear in only the three states that definitely prohibit it, viz. Utah, Connecticut and Kansas, and in
the one state that specifically allows it, Virginia.
Wolfe, "Legal and Psychiatric Aspects of Voluntary Sterilization," 3 ]. Family L. 103, 118 (1963).
At the present time there are only three states,
Connecticut, Kansas and Utah which have legislation regarding voluntary sterilization. These
statutes permit voluntary sterilization only in cases
of medical necessity. Comment, 1 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 159, 174-75 (1966).
Today only Utah and Connecticut have laws
prohibiting sterilization except in cases of medical necessity. . . . "Voluntary Sterilization," Consumer Reports 384 (1971); See also Miller and
Dean, "Liability of Physicians for Sterilization
Operations," 16 ABA Journal 158, 160 (1930);
Tierney, "Voluntary Sterilization A Necessary Alternative?" IV Family L.Q. 373, 378 (1970).
These authorities afford a clear indication that from
the time the statute was enacted the practical interpreta19

tion of the statute has been that it is meant to prohibit
voluntary sterilization. Defendants therefore urge that
the interpretation given the statute by the district court
be reversed.
POINT

III

THE STATUTE IS IN HARMONY WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF SINGLE
SUBJECT MATTER.
As one of its claims below, plaintiffs alleged that the
statute violates Article VI, § 23, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah. That Section reads:
Except general appropriation bills and bills
for the codification and general revision of laws,
no bill shall be passed containing more than one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its
title.
Defendants submit that the common and accepted
meaning of the statute clearly meets this constitutional
requirement of single subject matter.
The chapter of which the statute is a part is entitled
simply "Sterilization". That has been the title of the
chapter since its inclusion in the Revised Statutes of Utah
(1933). The title "Sterilization" meets the constitutional
requirements as they are explained by Sutherland, rnpra
at § 1702:
The constitutional requirement that every
law shall have but one subject which shall be
expressed in the title, was not imposed to hamper
or impede the legislative process. It was not de20

signed as a loophole of escape from, or a means
for the destruction of legitimate enactments . . . .
The dominant objective of the provision is to insure the titling of legislative acts in a manner that
will give reasonable notice of the purview to the
members of the assembly and to the public. All
that is necessary is that anyone interested in or
affected by the subject matter of the bill be put
upon inquiry. The general test is whether the
title is uncertain, misleading or deceptive to the
average reader and if the court feels that the title
is sufficient to direct a person of ordinary reasonably inquiring mind to the body of the act, compliance with the constitution has been affected.
The same author states at § 1706-7:
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute
alleged to be defectively titled, every presumption
favors the validity of the act. As is true in cases
presenting other constitutional issues, the courts
avoid declaring an act unconstitutional whenever
possible. Where there is any doubt as to the sufficiency of either the title, or the act, the legislation should be sustained.

To invalidate a statute for dual or multiple
subject matter, the variance in the provisions of
an act must be palpable and totally irreconcilable.
'Unless a substantive matter entirely disconnected
with the named legislation is included within the
bill, the act does not fall within the constitutional
inhibitions.' (Citation omitted). All provisions
that are incidental or auxiliary to or in any reasonable sense will promote the object indicated
in the title, legitimately may be included in the
act.

21

Defendants urge that even the mere mention of the
word "sterilization" in the title of a legislative enactment
would serve to give the notice required by the Utah Constitution to a person who might seek to have a voluntary
sterilization operation performed. The facts of presentday medical practice in Utah are evidence that the statute
is commonly understood to prohibit voluntary sterilization. Davis v. Walton, supra, is evidence of that understanding at the time the statute was passed.
In State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P.2d 1075
(1959), at 318, 1078, this court further clarified the single subject matter requirement as follows:

[T]he title does not have to be an index to
the act. All that is required is that the subject
matter of the act be reasonably related to the title
and that all parts of the act be reasonably related
to each other.
In that case, the court held that an act prohibited
not only the causing of death while driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but also the -.!using of
death while driving under the influence of narcotic drugs
or other drugs to a degree which renders the driver incapable of the safe operation of his vehicle; whereas,
the title of the act prohibited only the causing of death
while driving under the influence of intoxicating liouor.

Even the title of the original enactment in the instant case (L. Utah ch. 82 § 7 [ 1925], subsequently changed
to "Sterilization" at the time of codification, clearly
meets the constitutional standard. That title was: "Sterilization of Sexual Criminals, Idiots, etc." Providing a
22

penalty for violation of the statute; that is, for sterilization of any person except under the provisions of the
statute, is certainly at least incidental and auxiliary to
the object of the title; namely, the sterilization of listed
classes of persons. Such a provision certainly is not palpably and irreconcilably at variance with or entirely disconnected from the title or the other provisions of tht:
chapter. This is particularly true in view of the inclusion
of Section 6 in the original enactment (Section 11 of the
present statute). That Section, by its language, does not
apply solely to the sterilization of institutionalized persons.
The requirement of single subject matter is of no
consequence with respect to codes. Sutherland, supra, says
at§ 3707:
The constitutional requirement that a bill
shall have but ore subject expressed in its title
has been held either not to apply to or is liberally
interpreted to sustain the validity of a title identifying a code.
This means that there is no merit to the claim that
the statute in question could not stand if it were held to
<tpply to noninstitutionalized persons, because it is a part
of the "State Institutions" code.
Utah is not the only state which has included its prohibition of voluntary sterilization under the code heading "State Institutions." The Kansas law (L. of Kansas
1917, ch. 299 7 [repealed 1965]) had language similar
to that of the Utz.h statute and was included in the Kans:.s code under "State Institutions."
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Defendants respectfully urge that the statute's prescription of a criminal penalty for the performance of or
participation by an institutionalized person or a noninstitutionalized person in a voluntary sterilization operation or a sterilization operation otherwise in violation of
the authority of the chapter does not violate the constitutional requirement of single subject matter.
POINT

IV

THE ACTION WAS NOT PROPERLY BROUGHT
AS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23 OF THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; NEITHER WERE
THE PARTIES PROPERLY JOINED UNDER RULE 19
AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EXERCISING JURISDICTION WITHOUT SUMMONING ALL
PARTIES HAVING A JOINT INTEREST.
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) allows members of a
class to bring a representative action where "persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court." In the instant
case, however, plaintiffs' neither made a showing of the
existance of a class as so defined, nor a showing that persons constituting the alleged class are determinate in number or so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court.
Certainly all persons capable of procreation do not
conform to plaintiffs' "class." Perhaps no persons other
than the named plaintiffs so conform. Plaintiffs simply
alleged that there exists a class of persons who desire
to undergo sterilization operations, but whose doctors

24

have refused to perform such operations. There was no
evidence before the district court that citizens other than
plaintiffs have ever asked a doctor to perform a sterilization operation and have been refused because of the law
in question. See Williams v. Kansas City, Mo., 104 F.
Supp. 848, 857 (W.D. Mo. 1952). Nor was there testimony or other evidence identifying the doctors who allegedly refused to perform sterilization operations upon
plaintiffs. In brief, by their failure to enumerate the
members of the class, to prove that there is a class of
people of the nature claimed, and to define the make-up
of that class beyond ephemeral terms, plaintiffs failed to
state a class action and are not entitled to relief which
is binding upon anyone besides themselves. See Giordano
v. Radio Corp. of America, 183 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1950);
Johnson v. Riverland Levee District, 117 F.2d 711 (8th
Cir. 1941).
Defendants urge that plaintiffs, having failed to
properly state a class action, also failed to comply with
Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding necessary joinder of parties. Rule 19(a) states in part:
[P]ersons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants.
Plaintiffs failed to join as defendants the county and
district attorneys for the jurisdiction in which the action
was brought and defendants urge that the exercise of jurisdiction by the district court under such circumstances
constituted reversible error.
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The county and district attorneys are necessary parties to the instant action for the reason that it is they who
are charged with the enforcement of the statute in question. The attorney general is not charged with that duty.
As is dear from the statutory duties of the attorney general with respect to county attorneys, he is responsible
only to exercise supervisory power over and assist district
and county attorneys in the discharge of their duties. The
following is the pertinent language from Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-5-1 (1968):
It is the duty of the attorney general:

* * *

(5) To exercise supervisory powers over the
district and county attorneys of the state in all
matters pertaining to the duties of their offices.

* * *

( 7) When required by the public service or
directed by the governor to assist any district or
county attorney in the discharge of his duties.
Therefore, the attorney general may not direct or
supersede the county and district attorneys with respect
to the duties of their offices. The most the atttorney general may do is assist when required by the public interest
or directed by the governor. He may initiate local prosecutions only upon default of the local prosecutors. See
National Association of Attorneys General, Committee on
the Office of Attorney General, The Office of Attorney
General 128-136 (1971). Furthermore, county and district attorneys are, by statute, elected officials whose true
ultimate responsibility is to the electorate. See Utah Code
Ann. § 67-7-1 (1968) and § 17-16-6 (1953); Const. of
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Utah, Art. VIII, § 10. It is proper that they be concerned
with matters that affect their constituencies. The instant
case is such a matter.
Hence, with regard to their duties, county and district attorneys are not explicitly subordinates of or subject
to the command of the attorney general.
Among the duties of the county attorneys are the
following:
The county attorney is a public prosecutor,
and must:
( 1) Conduct on behalf of the state all prosecutions for public offenses within his county. . . .
(2) Institute proceedings before the proper
magistrate for the arrest of persons charged with,
or reasonably suspected of, any public offense
when he has information that any such offense has
been committed, and for that purpose must attend
in person or by deputy upon the magistrate in
cases of arrests when required by them.
( 3) . . . All the duties and powers of public prosecutor shall be assumed and discharged by
the county attorney.
Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (Supp. 1971).
As to district attorneys, Utah Code Ann. § 67-7-4
(1968) (repealed effective 1973) says:
. . . All duties and powers of public prosecutor
shall be assumed and discharged by the district
attorney . . . .
Section 5 of the same chapter states:
The district attorney shall appear and prosecute for the state in the district court of his dis27

trict in all criminal prosecutions except misdemeanor appeals. . . .
The foregoing quotations are sufficient to indicate
that the district and county attorneys of the jurisdiction
in which the instant action was brought were interested
enough to merit joinder as defendants below, being
charged with independent and exclusive authority, except upon their own default, to initiate felony prosecutions under the statute in question. As a result, defendants submit that the failure of the plaintiffs to join such
parties as defendants in the present action violated Rule
19(a) and that the exercise of jurisdiction by the district
court under such circumstances constituted reversible
error.

POINT V
IF THE ACTION CAN BE CONSIDERED A PROPER CLASS ACTION, IT IS BY NATURE A SPURIOUS
CLASS ACTION AND UNDER THE TERMS OF RULE
23 JUDGMENT MAY BE MADE BINDING ONLY
UPON THE NAMED PARTIES.
With reference to the original federal Rule 23(a)
( 3) (the spurious class action provision), which is similar
to the present Utah Rule 23(a) (3), Moore's Federal Practice, (2d ed. 1969), says at 23-2602 and 23-2603:
There was no jural relationship between the
members of the class; unlike, for example, the
members of unincorporated associations, they had
taken no steps to create a legal relationship among
themselves. They were not fellow travelers by
agreement. The right or liability of each was
distinct. The class was formed solely by the presence of a common question of law or fact.
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If the present action is susceptible to consideration as
a class action, it is clear that it is the spurious category to
which it belongs. There certainly exists no jural relationship between the alleged class members. They are incapable of identification, except by an opinion poll of
every single citizen. No alleged class members have taken
steps to create a legal relationship among themselves.
The sole basis of classification is the interest in obtaining
sterilization operations'. a question of law which the
named plaintiffs share in common, but which has not
been shown to be an interest of any other persons.
In the present action, where there has been no proof
that there are other persons similarly situated who have
the same claim as the named plaintiffs, a judgment may not
be made binding beyond the named plaintiffs. That rule
has been stated in Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake Farmers
Association, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773 (1955) at 24,
780:
The spurious representative class action involves the enforcement of rights which are several
where there is a common question of law or fact.
It is conclusive and binding only on the parties
to the action . . . . It is really an invitation to all
persons similarly situated to join in the action and
litigate their several claims but, except to the extent common claims are litigated, it has no binding
effect on the members of the class who are not
parties to the action. In such cases intervention
should be freely granted.
Defendants urge that the dependency of the instant
suit not upon a jural or other legal relationship common
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to alleged class members, rather upon a claim allegedly
common to a class places the suit (if it is at all to be considered a class action) in the category of a spurious class
action.
Defendants, therefore, urge that the district court
erred in giving its judgment binding effect upon all members of the so-called class, other than the parties named
in the action.
CONCLUSION
Defendants respectfully urge this Honorable Court
to reverse the partial summary judgment entered by the
district court on the ground that the issue in this case whether or not voluntary sterilization is lawful - is a
nonjusticiable, political question, suited exclusively to the
legislative function. Defendants urge that in 1925 the
Utah State Legislature effectively resolved the issue by
prohibiting voluntary sterilization.
Even had no legislative action heretofore been taken
concerning this subject, defendants urge that it is not
the province of the judiciary to take action now to allow
voluntary sterilization. Defendants urge that the legislation of other states and the experience of the medical
and legal professions point to serious consequences which
can result from ill-administered voluntary sterilization
procedures. The subject requires the attention of the investigative, opinion-assessing, policy-making legislative
function and lacks the criteria required for a satisfactory
judicial determination. Defendants therefore urge that
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the district court erred in exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
Defendants further urge this Honorable Court to
accept as clear and unambiguous the terms of the statute
prohibiting voluntary sterilization. Defendants urge that
the statute's common and ordinary meaning, together with
a related court decision and contemporaneous and practical interpretation, give effect to the prohibition contained therein against all sterilization operations, except
those authorized by the chapter and those incidental to
other surgical procedures.
Defendants urge that the statute complies with the
constitutional requirement of single subject matter, for
the title of the chapter of which the statute is a part is
simply "Sterilization". Defendants urge that this term is
broad enough to give the requisite notice to those persons
who might seek voluntary sterilization that such operations are dealt with in the chapter and is definite enough to lead those persons to discover that such
operations are prohibited under criminal sanction by the
chapter.
Furthermore, defendants urge this Honorable Court
to reverse the district court for erring in the exercise of
in personam jurisdiction without summoning all parties
having joint interests in the action. Defendants urge that
plaintiffs have claimed the existence of a class incapable
of definiton and have failed to present facts which would
substantiate an exercise of jurisdiction by the district court
over persons not named as parties to the action. Defend-
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ants also urge that plaintiffs failed to join as defendants
certain necessary parties; namely, the county and district
attorneys of the jurisdiction in which the action was
brought. Defendants maintain that such are interested
parties by virtue of their independent statuory duty to enforce the statute in question and their responsibility to
their constituencies.
Finally, defendants urge this Honorable Court to
view the instant action as a spurious class action, if it is
to be viewed as a class action at all, and limit any effect
given to the judgment below to the parties named in the
complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
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